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CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION: 28 U. S. C. § 2283 AND
EXCLUSIV"E FEDERAL JURISDICTION
DAviD

R. KocHERY*

A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State Court except as expressly authorized
by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,
or to protect or effectuate its judgments. 28 U. S. C. § 2283

(1949).
The judicial power of the courts of the various states derives,
principally, from the laws and constitutions of the respective
states. This jurisdiction is general, and the federal ConstitutionaZ
provisions relating to the judiciary do not remove from the state
courts their traditional general jurisdiction.' The inferior Constitutional federal courts must first be created by Congress, and the
extent of their jurisdiction is determined by Congress itself,
limited by the terms of Article III of the Constitution. 2 Thus,
except for the Supreme Court,3 every federal court acquires its
jurisdiction directly from Congress, and only indirectly from the
Constitution. It seems accepted that Congress, in creating inferior
courts, need not exhaust its Constitutional power; therefore, that
body may contract or expand the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts within the boundaries of the Constitutional grant.4
Within that grant, it follows, Congress may expand the jurisdiction of the inferior courts to the limit of the Constitutional
grant, and, in addition, to the whole or partial exclusion of all
state courts.3 Thus the decision as to whether particular matters
should be litigated exclusively in federal courts, or concurrently
with state courts, is one within the recognized power of Congress.
Congress has, in some cases, made use of its power to confer
jurisdiction exclusively upon federal courts.' It has, on the other
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Buffalo. This paper was prepared for
future submission as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree, J.S.D., Yale

Lav School.
1. Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U. S. 511 (1898).

On the

other hand, states courts may not decline jurisdiction to enforce a federal right in a
manner which would discriminate against that right. Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947).
See also, Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399-400 (U. S. 1821) ; Claffin v. Housenan,

93 U.S. 130 (1876).

2. See United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U. S. 463 (1936);
Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263 (1934) ; Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226

(1922) ; Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624 (1884).

3. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., supra note 2; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1

Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1816).
4. See supra notes 2, 3.
5. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 (1944) ; Plaquenines Tropical Fruit Co.
v. Henderson, sura note 1.
6. Bowles v. Willingham, supra note 5. (Emergency Price Control Act) ; Norton
v. Warner Co., 321 U. S. 565 (1944) (Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act);
(Footnote continued on following page.)
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hand, conferred upon state courts jurisdiction concurrent with
that of the inferior federal courts.7 In other instances, Congress
has merely codified (except for the $3,000 requirement) the Constitutional implication, viz., that state courts and federal courts
have concurrent jurisdiction. This concurrency is manifested in
two broad areas: general federal question8 cases and diversity
and alienage9 cases.
Clearly, there is a broad category of rights and duties over
whose determination the jurisdictions of federal and state courts
are concurrent, and wherein those jurisdictions may compete.
This conflict in jurisdiction will usually involve one of two general
types of problems: problems involved when the proceedings in
both the state and federal courts are in rem, 10 and those problems involved when both proceedings are in personam or one is
in rem and the other in personam.11 In determining whether the
federal court or the state court can interfere with the action proceeding concurrently in the other court, principles of comity as
embodied in statutes or rules of court are invoked to resolve the
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
Central N.E. Ry. Co. v. Boston & A. R. Co., 297 U. S. 415 (1929) (suits to enjoin
I.C. C. orders) ; General Investment Co. v Lake Shore & Michigan. 260 U S. 261 (1922)
(private actions to enjoin antitrust violations) ; Wright v. S. E. C., 112 F. 2d 89 (2d
Cir. 1940) (Securities Exchange Act). See also, 28 U. S.C. §§ 1333, 1334, 1338, 1351,
1355, 1356, 1491, 1583 (exclusive federal jurisdiction expressly provided); 28 U. S. C.
§§ 1346, 2321, 2322 (exclusive federal jurisdiction impliedly provided).
On the Constitutional power of Congress to create exclusive federal jurisdiction,
generally, in addition to cases cited, supra, see Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U. S. 178 (1944) ;
Lockerty v. Phillips,319 U. S. 182 (1943) ; Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1820).
7. Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1, 56-7 (1912) (F.E.L.A.) ;
Testa v. Katt, supra note 1 (Emergency Price Control Act); Garrett v. Moore-MeCoruzack Co., 317 U. S. 239 (1942) (Merchant Marine Act); Williams v. Austrian,
331 U. S. 642 (1947) (portions of Bankruptcy Act).
8. 28 U. S. C. § 1343(3).
Congress' belated creation of federal question jurisdiction in the Act of March 3, 1875, 18 STAT. 470, did not withdraw from the states
their jurisdictions over these cases. See Robb v. Connolly, supra note 2. The "Midnight
Judges" Act of February 13, 1801, 2 STAT. 89, had created federal question jurisdiction,
but it was repealed on March 8, 1802, 2 STAT. 132.
9. 28 U. S. C. § 1332. Concurrent jurisdiction in diversity cases was expressly
provided for in the Act of Sept. 24, 1879, § 11, 1 STAT. 73, 78:
. . . [T]he circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the
courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in
equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the
sum or value df five hundred dollars, and . . . an alien is a party, or the suit
is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of
another State.
10. Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 189 (1935) (the court
first acquiring jurisdiction of the res may maintain and exercise that jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the other).
11. Regardless of which court first acquired the case, both proceedings may be
carried on simultaneously. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922) (diversity) ; Grubb v. P. U. C., 281 U. S. 470 (1930) (federal question).
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conflict and to 12maintain a rapport between the two distinct systems of courts.
With respect to the federal courts, legislation has been
enacted from time to time providing for the resolution of conflicts between the jurisdictions of the federal and state courts.
In general, the tendency has been for Congress to contract the
power of federal courts to interfere with proceedings in state
courts or with any state action, particularly the power to issue
injunctions against state proceedings. 3 The trend toward limiting federal court power vis-a-vis state actions can also be found
in decisions of the Supreme Court. 4 The most comprehensive
of all limitations, however, is Section 2283 of the Judicial Code
(28 U. S. C.) of 1948, to be discussed hereafter.
Federal judicial decisions involving an attempt to resolve
state-federal conflicts in the area of jurisdiction of courts make
it reasonably clear that, where the jurisdiction of the respective
courts or systems is concurrent, statutory and judicial rules of
comity dictate that, with few exceptions, federal courts should not
interfere by injunction with state action or proceedings. 5 Cases
affording concurrent jurisdiction would ordinarily be those based
on a general federal question or diversity and alienage where the
12. Hale v. Bimco Trading Co., 306 U.S. 375 (1939) ; Wells Fargo & Co. V.
Taylor, 254 U. S. 175 (1920) ; Durfee and Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State Courts, 30 MIca. L. REv. 1145 (1932) ; Taylor and Willis, The Power of
Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YA.LE L. 3. 1159 (1933);
Warren, Federal and State Court Injunctions, 43 HARv. L. REv. 345 (1930) ; Barrett,
Federal Injunctions Against Proceedings in State Courts, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 545 (1947).
13. 28 U. S. C. § 2283 (general prohibition); 28 U. S. C. § 2282 (three-judge
court to enjoin enforcement of state statute or order) ; 28 U. S. C. § 1341 (Johnson Act,
substantially withdrawing federal jurisdiction to enjoin state rate orders) ; Act of Aug.
21, 1937, curtailing federal jurisdiction to enjoin imposition of state taxes).
14. Plaintiff attacking action must generally exhaust his state administrative
remedies. Illinois Commerce Commission v. Thonson, 318 U. S. 675 (1943) ; Prentis
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 211 U. S. 210 (1908). Cf. City Bank Farmers"Trust Co.
v. Schnader, 291 U. S. 24 (1934). Even after exhaustion of state remedies, a party
may invoke federal jurisdiction only as permitted in the limiting statutes cited in note
13, supra. See Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 290 U. S.
264 (1933) ; W'illcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 39-40 (1909).
Prior to the enactment of 28 U. S. C. § 2283, in 1948, the Supreme Court had
held that a state proceeding could not be stayed by a federal court even though the
matter had already been litigated in a federal court. Toucey v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 314
U. S. 118 (1941) (overruled by § 2283). Other areas in which federal courts have
limited interference with state proceedings: Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 312 U. S.
45 (1941) (state criminal proceedings; cf. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157
[1943]; Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176 (1935) (liquidation of financial
institutions) ; Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 309 U. S. 478 (1940) (permitting state court to decide Constitutional questions, thus making it unnecessary for
federal court to do so) ; cf. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228 (1943)
(holding that mere difficulty of state-law questions should not impel federal court to
surrender jurisdiction)).
15. See notes 13-14, supra. For recognized exceptions to the predecessor of 28
U. S. C. § 2283 (§ 265 of Judicial Code), see Toucey v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., supra note 14.
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amount in controversy is in excess of $3,000. On the other hand,
federal decisions have failed to grapple adequately with the
proper role of a federal court when there is state-court "usurpation" of cases or controversies which Congress has provided shall
be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal system. Is a
federal court obliged to assume the same "hands-off" attitude
where exclusive federal jurisdiction is ignored by a state court
as it would assume where federal and state jurisdictions are concurrent7
The Supreme Court and the Second Circuit recently have
handed down decisions involving state-federal conflicts of jurisdiction.' The problem posed by those decisions will be dealt with
here.
THE STATUTE-28

U. S. C. § 2283

As part of the Act of March 2, 1793, 1' Congress enacted the
original and most comprehensive statutory restraint on the general power of federal courts to interfere with proceedings in
state courts. This Act, designed to amend the previous statute
creating and establishing federal courts,"' granted to federal courts
certain powers to issue injunctions, but contained the following
brief provision :19
• . . nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state
No separate reports of the debates which lead to this enactment
are available, and considerable uncertainty exists as to the specific
reasons for the inclusion of this restrictive provision at the time
of its enactment. 20 Nevertheless, the language continued as originally drafted until an exception was made as to proceedings in
bankruptcy in the revision of the United Statutes, 2' based upon
Section 21 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867.22 Thus the following
amended language was finally inserted in the revision:
except in cases where such an injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy.
This was the only exception incorporated into the Act itself,
through the revision of 1911,23 until the enactment of the 1948
16. Amalgamated Garment Workers, etc. v. Rich,n, Bros., Inc., 23 U. S. L. WEEK
4165 (U. S. April 4, 1955); L U. E. W. v. Underwood Corp., 219 F. 2d 100 (2d Cir.

1955).
17. 1 STAT. 334, 335.

18. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 73.
19. Supra note 17.
20. See, generally, background discussion in Toucey v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 314
U.S. 118 (1941).
21. R.S. § 720 (1874).
22. 14 STAT. 526.
23. 36 STAT. 1162.
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revision. 4 What was originally Section 265 of the Judicial Code
became, after 1948, Section 2283 of the Judicial Code. The present
language of the section is as follows:
Stay of State Court Proceedings-A court of the United States
may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court
except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate its
judgments.
In brief, Section 2283 now provides that no injunction shall be
issued by a federal court staying state court proceedings unless
it can be shown that such an injunction either (1) has been expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or (2) is necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction, or (3) is necessary to protect or effectuate its
judgment already rendered.

Two RECENT APPLICATIONS op' § 2283
Court and the Second Circuit have recently
Supreme
The
restricted federal-court power as that power may be exercised to
interfere with state court proceedings. The cases will be discussed
together.
25
In Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros.
("Richman") and in International Union (I.U.E.W.) v. Underwood Corporation26 ("Underwood"), an employer brought suit
in a state court to obtain injunctive relief against the activities
of a labor union. In each case the union brought suit in a federal
district court to enjoin the employer from proceeding with its
suit in the state court in so far as such state suit alleged activities
of the union encompassed within the provisions of the LaborManagement Relations Act (Taft-Hartley).2 7 In each case, Held,
Section 2283 is applicable, and, since the case fell within none of
the exceptions thereto, a federal court is without power to restrain
the proceeding in the state court. Each opinion took pains to assume that the activities of the union involved were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board28 under
the rule of the Garnerand Weber decisions, 29 and therefore beyond
the jurisdiction of the state court. Judge Frank, in the Underwood
24. 62

STAT.

968.

25. 23 U. S. L. WEzx 4165 (No. 173, April 4, 1955) (5-3 decision).
26. 219 F. 2d 100 (2d Cir. 1955).
27. 49 STAT. 449 (1935) ; 61 STAT. 136 (1947) ; 29 U. S. C. Supp. V, §§ 151 et seq.
28. 23 U. S. L. WEEK at 4166; 219 F. 2d at 101.
29. Garner v. Teantsters' Union, 346 U. S. 485 (1954) ; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 23 U. S. L. WEEK 4150 (U. S. Apr. 4, 1955). Garner and Weber must be confined to injunction suits affecting labor disputes, since common law damage actions for
specific torts may be brought in state courts notwithstanding the tort may have been
committed in a labor dispute. United Construction Workers v. Laburnam Constr. Co.,
74 S. Ct. 833 (U. S. 1954).
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decision, clearly expressed the dilemma posed by such decisions
with respect to labor controversies :
We recognize that the result may be regarded as undesirable, if,
as we have assumed, arguendo, Underwood's state-court complaint seeks an injunction against nothing but unfair labor
practices which are exclusively covered by the Labor Management Relations Act. For, if the state-court does grant such an
injunction, and if its order is fatally defective as exceeding the
proper area of state jurisdiction but is affirmed by the highest
state court, then, long before that order can be reversed by the
United States Supreme Court, its practical effect may well be
to break the strike by invalid means. Thus, on that assumption, by refusing to complain to the Board, the company may
achieve its aim and thereby frustrate the Congressional policy
embodied in the Labor Management Relations Act, .
Concededly, an ultimate appeal to the Supreme Court from an
affirmance of a permanent injuncion 1 by the highest court of the
state will result in a holding that the state court had no jurisdiction in the first place, and that jurisdiction was exclusively within
the federal system. 2
Without confining oneself to the problems of remedies and
jurisdiction peculiar to the field of labor relations,33 the principal
30. 219 F. 2d at 103. See also, Justice Frankfurter's similar language in Richnal,
23 U. S. L. WEEK at 4167. Judge Frank may be inviting Congressional action.
Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, considers this nothing more than any "federal
question" case, where Supreme Court review after state-court litigation is deemed
sufficient. See notes 45-48, infra, and accompanying text.
31. Interlocutory or temporary injunctions in state courts are not reviewable in
the Supreme Court. Montgomery Bldg. Union v. Ledbetter, 344 U. S. 178 (1952).
32. See supra note 29.
33. See, e. g., Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. Rv.
1297 (1954). See n. 29, supra.
Clearly, the employer will never file a complaint with the N.L.R.B. so long as
he has his state-court injunction. If he did so file, the Board would be enabled to
enjoin the state proceeding. Capital Service, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 347 U. S. 501 (1954).
Judge Frank, in Underwood, assumed, arguendo, that the Board could intervene in a
union's federal suit, even without a complaint having been filed. 219 F. 2d at 102.
Justice Frankfurter, in Richman, seems to have invited the union to confer jurisdiction
upon the Board, in cases where the employer seeks state relief, under the rule of 11. T.
Carter & Brother, 90 N. L. R. B. 2020 (1950) (holding that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer to procure a state-court injunction against activity protected
in L. M. R. A.). 23 U. S. L. WEEK at 4168, n. 6.
Removal: May a union, in such circumstances as these, remove the state suit
to a federal court under 28 U. S. C. § 1441(a)? This was attempted by the union in
Richman' but the district court remanded. Richman Bros. v. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers, 114 F. Supp. 185, rehearing denied 116 F. Supp. 800 (N. D. Ohio 1953) (on
the ground the district court had no jurisdiction of subject matter under L. M. R. A.).
See also, Direct Transit Lines v. Starr, 219 F. 2d 699 (6th Cir. 1955). Contra:
Direct Transit Lines v. Mackey, 34 LRRM 2572 (W. D. Mich. 1954); Overton
v. Int'l Brotherhood, etc., 115 F. Supp. 764 (W. D. Mich. 1953) (both cases holding that 28 U. S. C. § 1337 confers jurisdiction upon the district courts over any
(Footnote continued on following page.)
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difficulty with the two decisions mentioned above is the broad,
practically discussionless, assumption that Section 2283 affects
district-court power even where there is a complete absence of
concurrent jurisdiction. Where the jurisdiction, as here, is concededly exclusive of the state courts and confined to the federal
system, it may be that it was never intended that Section 2283
obliged federal courts to extend such deference to state proceedings
in attempting to insure or create a pristine integrity for state
judiciaries.
That Section 2283 may not be applicable at all where there
is no concurrent jurisdiction was not discussed at all by Judge
Frank in Underwood, and apparently was not raised. But the
point was urged before the Supreme Court in the Richman case,
both by the Labor Board, as amicus curiae,34 and by the petitionerunion 5 Mr. Justice Frankfurter confined his discussion of this
argument as follows :36
In the
accept
curiae,
in the

face of this carefully considered enactment,3 7 we cannot
the argument of petitioner and the Board, as amicus
that § 2283 does not apply whenever the moving party
District Court alleges that the state court is "wholly

without jurisdiction of the subject matter, having invaded a
field preempted by Congress." No such exception had been established by judicial decision under former § 265.38 In any
event, Congress has left no justification for its recognition now.
This is not a statute conveying a broad general policy for appropriate ad hoc application. Legislative policy is here expressed
in a clear-cut prohibition qualified only by specifically defined
exceptions.
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress [herein, L. M. R. A.] regulating
commerce). See also, Capital Serice, Iic. v. N. L. R. B., ibid., wherein no distinction
under 28 U. S. C. § 1337 is made between public and private plaintiffs, thus completing
the picture after A. F. L. v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582 (1946).
34. 23 U. S. L. WEEK at 4166.
35. Brief for Petitioners, pp. 28-33, Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman
Bros., 23 U. S. L. WEEK 4165 (U. S. April 4. 1955).
36. 23 U. S. L. WEK at 4166. Justices Frankfurter, Burton, Reed, Clark, and
Minton constituted the majority. Justice Harlan did not participate.
37. As to "carefully considered", cf. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CouaRs
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 1075-1078 (1953); Barrett, op. cit. supra note 12.
38. [Court's footnote] The statement in Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503,
511, that "Congress thus preempted jurisdiction in favor of the Emergency Court to
the exclusion of state courts. The rule express in § 265 which is designed to avoid
collisions between state and federal authorities . . . thus does not come into play",
must be read in the context of the scheme of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942
(56 STAT. 23) and particularly the authority in that Act for resort by the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration to injunctive relief under the circumstances there presented. §205 (a), 56 STAT. 33. It is also to be noted that this observation was made prior to the revision of 1948.
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Chief Justice Warren, on the other hand, disagreed with the majority, both on recent judicial precedent and on prior historical
grounds. In dissent, he stated :"
In the Willingham case, 40 a landlord had obtained a state
court injunction restraining the Price Administrator from issuing certain rent orders under the Emergency Price Control Act.
The Price Administrator brought an action in a federal district court to enjoin enforcement of the state court injunction.
Exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of rent orders,
the Administrator argued, was vested by Congress in the Emergency Court of Appeals. This Court upheld the Administrator's position. As one ground for its decision that § 265 of the
Judicial Code-the predecessor of § 2283-was no bar to the injunction sought by the Administrator, the Court stated (321
U. S. at 511) :
"Congress thus preempted jurisdiction in favor of the
Emergency Court to the exclusion of state courts. The rule
expressed in § 265 which is designed to avoid collisions between state and federal authorities . . . thus does not come
into play."
Thus stood the law in 1948 when Section 265 was succeeded by
the present Section 2283.
The quotation from the Willingham case, utilized by Chief Justice
Warren, above, stands for the proposition that Section 2283 (former Section 265) does not apply at all in the area of exclusive
federal jurisdiction; therefore Justice Frankfurter's remarks
anent the Willingham language seem somewhat inappropriate :41
It is also to be noted that this observation was made prior to the
revision of 1948.
The import of Justice Frankfurter's position is as follows: Because of Section 2283 and its prohibition, a federal court is powerless to prevent state-court usurpation of exclusive federal-court
jurisdiction. Therefore, state courts may disrupt a reasonably
finely-wrought federal court system by assuming to hear and decide
cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court itself,
such as controversies between two or more states, and actions or
proceedings against ambassadors.42 And a fortiorari,state courts
may invade the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior federal courts,
for example, in cases involving crimes and offenses against the
United States; seizures on land and water; suits for fines and
39. 23 U. S. L. WEEx at 4168. The Chief Justice dissented on behalf of himself
and Justices Black and Douglas. Justice Douglas wrote a separate dissenting opinion
in which Justice Black and the Chief Justice concurred. 23 U. S. L. WEEK at 4169.
40. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 (1944), discussed infra.
41. 23 U. S. L. WEEK at 4166, n. 2.
42. 28 U. S. C. § 1351 (a) 1, 2.
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penalties incurred under federal laws; civil cases of admiralty

and maritime jurisdiction ;43 as well as many others.4

The unabashed suggestion here that there are highly anomolous possibilities to be realized from the Richman decision is not
based, contrary to certain language in that decision, 45 on a fear
that rights under a general federal law will be substantially frustrated by protracted litigation. Indeed, it is conceded that "federal question" jurisdiction was not conferred upon federal courts
until 1875, 46 and that theretofore state courts undertook to decide
all such cases. And, admittedly, as of this day, a "federal question" case being litigated in a state court is normally free from
injunctive interference from a federal court under Section 2283. '
But that is because jurisdiction is coitcurrent, and if the entire
hierarchy of state courts should "go wrong ' 4 in applying substantive law to the ease, the Supreme Court, on reviewing the
decision, will merely send it back to the state court for further
proceedings, or will reverse and decide outright. This is precisely the normal course of judicial review in any single system,
49
with an additional Supreme Court thrown in for good measure.
On the other hand, matters over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, although also involving a "Ifederal question", are
hardly apposite to "general federal question" jurisdiction. For,
where there is indeed exclusive federal jurisdiction, not only is
a litigant compelled to undergo possibly needless litigation
throughout two entirely separate judicial systems, in addition, an
entire fabric of Congressional jurisdictional and administrative
planning may have been frustrated. To hold that Section 2283
permits this to occur would seem to convert the section from a
statutory rule of comity into something quite the opposite. Indeed,
Justice Frankfurter himself once seemed to envision Section 2283
as being beyond the pale of exclusive federal jurisdiction.
Therefore, § 265 [present § 2283] has no relevance here. That
provision is an historical mechanism . . . for achieving harmony in one phase of our complicated federalism by avoiding
needless friction between two systems of courts having potential
43. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 STAT. 76, 78.
44. See note 6, supra.
45. 23 U. S. L. W=m at 4167.
46. See supra note 8.
47. Grubb v. P. U. C., 281 U. S. 470 (1930). See also, Southern Ry. Co. v.
Painter,314 U. S. 155 (1941) ; B. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S.44 (1941); Miles
v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 315 U S. 698 (1941).
48. Language of Justice Frankfurter, 23 U. S. L. WEK at 4167.
49. Re-trying the case under such circumstances would be simplified in so far
as the "law of the case" may have been established. Where the Supreme Court's holding
would be that the state court had no jurisdiction, that is all, ordinarily, which would
be decided.
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jurisdiction over the same subject-matter. Wells Fargo & Co.
v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175, 183. The present record presents no
occasion for bringing this safeguard into play. 0
FuXTHr.ER CoIsiDmrATIoxs
It has been authoritatively held that Section 2283 is not a

jurisdictional statute. Rather, "it is an affirmation of the rules
of comity . . . I,1 or, as the Supreme Court has stated,
It is not a jurisdictional statute. It neither confers jurisdiction upon the district courts nor takes away the jurisdiction
otheiwise specifically conferred upon them by federal statutes
. . .Where the plaintiff has the undoubted right to invoke
its federal jurisdiction the court is bound to take the case and
proceed to judgment . . . And when the court takes jurisdiction and determines that in the light of § 265 [present
§ 2283] of the Code it is either authorized or prevented from
is plainly
granting the injunction prayed, its decision . .
not a decision upon a jurisdictional issue but upon the question
whether there is or is not equity in the particular
5 2 bill; that is,
a decision going to the merits of the controversy.

Indeed, without this interpretation of the section, the recognized
judicial and statutory exceptions to the predecessor of Section
2283 could never have been created in view of the unqualified
language of the provision. 3 Jurisdiction of district courts to
hear and decide a suit to stay a state court proceeding where
jurisdiction is exclusive to the federal courts would ordinarily
be based upon 28 U. S. C. § 1337 (62 Stat. 931):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies.

The application of Section 1337 to suits against state-court usurpation of exclusive federal jurisdiction has been upheld with respect
to rights under the Taft-Hartley Act, " Emergency Price Control
50. Hale v. Bimco Trading Co., 306 U. S. 375, 378 (1939).
51. MooE, COMMENTARY ON THE JUDICIAL CODE 407 (1949).

See also Touecey
v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941) (dissent of Justice Reed).
52. Smith v. Apple, 264 U. S. 274, 278, 280 (1923). See also, Sovereign Camp
Woodmcn of the World v. O'Neill, 266 U. S. 292 (1924). For unfortunate language
to the contrary, see International Union, etc. v. Underwood Corp., 219 F. 2d 100, 104,
105 (2d Cir. 1955).
Thus, where removal of the state suit is sought, the district court probably should
not renounce jurisdiction under section 2283, nor, indeed, under the Taft-Hartley Act.
See note 33, supra. Query as to Norris-LaGuardia. See Underwood, 219 F. 2d at 104
(citing cases).
53. See notes, 72, 73, infra, and accompanying text.
54. Capital Service, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 347 U. S. 501 (1954); A. F. L v. Watson,
327 U. S. 582 (1946). See also, with respect to removal, note 33, supra.
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Act," and was not renounced in the Richmnan case. Nor does
Section 1337 discriminate as to plaintiffs, and therefore either
a public or a private plaintiff may invoke its provisions.5 8
Once jurisdiction attaches under Section 1337, it would not
seem necessary that the provisions of the All-Writs statute57 be
invoked. That statute, which often should be construed with
Section 2283, provides:
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
Where the matters involved in a state proceeding are not within
a district court's actual or potential jurisdiction, 8 a prerogative
writ could not be said to be necessary "in aid of [its] jurisdiction". The district court's jurisdiction would be based on Section
1337 and that court's general equity power to enjoin would seem
to be sufficient. If Section 2283 is applicable, one of its exceptions
also is couched in terms of "in aid of its jurisdiction' ". This
probably does not mean jurisdiction under Section 1337, rather
pre-existing jurisdiction, else Section 2283 would mean nothing. 0
55. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 (1944).
56. Capital Service, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., op. cit. supra, note 54 (N. L. R. B.);
Bowles v. Willingham, supra note 55 (Price Administrator) ; A. F. L. v. Watson, supra,
note 54 (labor union). See also, dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Warren, in
Richanan, 23 U. S. L. WEEK at 4168. Only when section 2283 is declared applicable
do the courts discuss whether a plaintiff has a "legally protected interest". International
Union v. Underwood Corp., 219 F. 2d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1955). Similar language is
found in Richman, 23 U. S. L. WEEK at 4167. 28 U. S. C. § 1337 has, in addition, been
availed of by a private shipper, Peyton v. Railway Express Agency, 316 U. S. 350
(1942), and individual employees, Tunstall v. Brotherhood, etc., 323 U. S. 210 (1944).
57. 63 STAT. 102, 28 U. S. C. § 1651 (a) (1949). See 6 MooRs, FEDERAL PRACTICE
58-109 (2d ed. 1948).
58. In Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 (1944), the district court had no
jurisdiction over writs to invalidate rent orders. This was vested exclusively in the
Emergency Court of Appeals. §204 (d), 56 STAT. 33. In Bowles, the district court
was not asked to utilize a prerogative writ. In Richman, Justice Frankfurter pointed
out that a prerogative writ under section 1651 was inappropriate in the district
because jurisdiction of Taft-Hartley matters was vested in the Labor Board and the
Court of Appeals. 23 U. S. L. WEEK at 4167, n. 5. But note that district courts may
have potential jurisdiction on appeal if the Court of Appeals is in vacation. § 10 (e),
61 STAT. 136; 29 U. S. C. § 161 (e). In any case, jurisdiction of an unfiled complaint
with the Board is not very "potential" inasmuch as the Board has discretion to accept
or decline jurisdiction. Int'l Union v. Underwood, 219 F. 2d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1955)
Richinan, 23 U. S. L. WEEK at 4167, n. 5.
59. This was not accidental. See Reviser's Notes to § 2283, H. Rep. No. 308,
80th Cong. 1st Sess., A181-A182: "The phrase 'in aid of its jurisdiction' was added
to conform to section 1651 of this title . . ."
60. The Reviser's Notes, ibid., specifically mention that removal cases fall within
the "in aid of its jurisdiction" exception. See note 86, infra, and accompanying text.
Conceivably the in rem cases fall within the same exception. In rem cases were
recognized judicial exceptions under the predecessor of section 2283. Oklahoma v.
(Footnote continued on following page.)
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The decision of the Supreme Court in Bowles v. Willingham1
seemed to have answered two questions: (1) Is Section 2283 applicable where federal jurisdiction is exclusive? (2) Is it necessary that the exclusive federal jurisdiction be in the district
court granting the injunction against state proceedings? In
answering (1) in the negative, the Court was indulging in an
alternative holding, since it also appeared that the Emergency
Price Control Act permitted access to the district court for such
relief. Bowles has been referred to as holding that Section 2283
is inapplicable, 2 but Justice Frankfurter, in Richman, chose to
ignore this holding in favor of the other, without overruling any
portion of Bowles. 3 With respect to (2), above, it would seem
that the holding is firm, vie., that so long as the exclusive jurisdiction is within the federal system a district court has jurisdiction
under Section 1337.64
When the Court, in Bowles v. Willingham, stated that
Congress thus preempted jurisdiction in favor of the Emergency Court to the exclusion of state courts. The rule expressed
in § 265 which is designed to avoid collisions between state and
federal authorities . . . thus does not come into play.05

it was recognizing that federal-court forbearance, as a rule of
comity codified in Section 2383 (former Section 265), applies only
where jurisdiction is concurrent between federal and state courts.
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
Texas, 265 U. S. 490 (1924) (federal court having prior in rem jurisdiction may
enjoin state proceedings interfering therewith). Mere prior federal-court in personam
jurisdiction should not ground a federal injunction as an exception to section 2283
since it would not be "in aid" of the district court's jurisdiction. ". . . a controversy
over a mere question of personal liability . . . does not tend to impair or defeat the
jurisdiction of the court in which a prior action for the same cause is pending." Kline
v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 230 (1922). But see dicta in Looney v.
Eastern Texas R. R., 247 U. S. 214 at 221 (1918). A fortiorari, if federal in personam
jurisdiction is later than the state court's, or if there is no federal-court action filed
at all, then section 22 83's prohibition applies. But what of the situation where a state
court is litigating a matter within the exclusive jurisdicion of the federal system. If
section 2283 applies, would the "in aid" exception operate to permit an injunction of
the state proceeding? Would it make a difference whether or not the matter was also
presently being litigated in the federal court? See notes 90, et seq. infra, and accompanying text.
61. 321 U. S. 503 (1944). See notes 39, 40, sapra, and accompanying text.
62. Porter v. Dicken, 328 U. S. 252, 255 n. 1 (1946) ; Barrett, op. cit. supra,
note 12. Contra: H. J. Heinz Co. v. Owens, 189 F. 2d 505, 509 (9th Cir. 1951);
International Union, etc. v. William D. Baker Co., 100 F. Supp. 773, 777-778 (E.D.
Pa. 1951).
63. 23 U. S. L. WEEK at 4166, n. 2.
64. Capital Service, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 347 U. S.501 (1954) ; A. F. L. v. Watson,
327 U.S. 582 (1946); N. L. R. B. v. N. Y. State Labor Bd., 106 F. Supp. S.D.
N. Y. 1952). See also, Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, holding that a district court may enjoin
a state court proceeding against a discharged bankrupt to protect general bankruptcy
jurisdiction.
65. 321 U.S. at 511.
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And, where jurisdiction is exclusive to one court or system, other
principles of comity and forbearance come into play. The confinement of Section 2283 to the area of concurrent jurisdiction
was recognized by the courts long before Bowles v. Willingham
and Richman faced it squarely.6 6 Furthermore, at the time of
the original enactment of the predecessor of Section 2283,67 whatever jurisdiction Congress had seen fit to confer upon federal
courts then established was practically all concurrent with the
state courts. The prior Act of Sept. 24, 1789,8 then in force, conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon federal courts in only five
narrow areas: federal crimes and offenses; seizures on land and
water; federal penalties and forfeitures; suits against consuls;
cases under civil admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The deep
distrust of a federal judicial system which goaded the Founding
Fathers into drafting a clearly-defined Article I1I6 must surely
have inspired the legislative draftsman of the Act of 1789. Reluctant wresting of such jurisdiction from all state courts does
not seem a logical forerunner, four years later, of a provision
(present Section 2283) intended, as Richman would have us believe, to protect state-court jurisdiction over matters so recently
withdrawn from them entirely-and with wide-open eyes. Rather,
it would appear far more palatable that the predecessor of Section
2283 was directed at the far broader area of cases wherein state
and federal jurisdictions were concurrent. Indeed, the earliest
reported cases involving federal-court interference70 under Section
2283 all involved areas of concurrent jurisdiction.
Justice Frankfurter, in the Richman decision, defends his
holding that Section 2283 blankets the field on the ground that
the language of the section brooks no qualifications :71
Legislative policy is here expressed in a clear-cut prohibition
qualified only by specifically defined exceptions.
66. Hale v. Bimnco Trading Co., 306 U.S. 375 (1939) ; Smith v. Apple, 264 U. S.

274 (1924) ; Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175 (1920).

See also, N. L. R. B.

V. Sunshine Mining Co., 125 F. 2d 757 (9th Cir. 1942).
67. Act of March 2, 1793. See notes 17-20. supra, and accompanying text.

68. 1

STAT.

76, 78.

69. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HAaV. L. REv. 483
(1928) ; FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, c. 17 (1941).
70. Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch 179 (U. S. 1807) ; Peck v. Jenness, 7
How. 612 (U. S. 1849) ; Orton v. Smith, 18 How. 263, 266 (U. S. 1855).
71. 23 U. S. L. W=mi at 4166. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a majority of
22
83's immediate prethe Court, held the same feeling about the language of section
decessor. Toucey v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118 (1941). The revision of 1948
codified the dissenting opinion's more flexible approach as "the basic law as generally
understood . . . prior to the Toucey decision." Reviser's Notes, H. R. REP. No. 308,

80th Cong. 1st Sess., A181-A182.

A general shrinkage of federal jurisdiction would

not, it seems, be deplored by Justice Frankfurter. See, e. g., dissenting opinion in
National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tide-Water Transfer Co., 337 U. S. 582 (1949).
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The prohibition of the section has always been "clear-cut" since
1793; and, until 1948, there was only one "specifically defined
exception", the exception relating to proceedings in bankruptcy.
Notwithstanding, there was unanimity on the Court, prior to 1948,
that federal statutes conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon federal courts were implied exceptions to the predecessor of Section
2283, whether or not that statute expressly authorized an injunction against state court proceedings. 2 Furthermore, despite an
absence of appropriate "specifically defined exceptions" under
the former statute, there was unanimity on the Court that a federal
court first acquiring jurisdiction over a res could enjoin a subsequent interfering state-court proceeding quite apart from the provisions of the forerunner of Section 2283Y.7 It is indeed singular
that a Court, in 1941, finds a prohibitive statute inapplicable without the necessity of "specifically defined exceptions", but refuses,
fourteen years later, and under the same auspices, to find inapplicability unless there is a "specifically defined exception". By
such means are decisions made easy, obviating the necessity of
discussing cases, legislative history, or the consequences.
Richman's holding that Section 2283 (with its exceptions) is
applicable (despite the prior decisions) to cases involving exclusive jurisdiction leaves the present section in considerable doubt.
As stated previously, Section 2283 today contains three exceptions
to its general prohibition, whereas none of these exceptions were
expressed prior to 1948. As it now stands, federal courts must
forebear from interfering with state-court proceedings except
(1) as expressly authorized by Act of Congress or
(2) where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or
(3) to protect or effectuate its judgments.
The Reviser's Notes 74 explain the first exception as follows:
An exception as to Acts of Congress relating to bankruptcy was
omitted and the general exception substituted to cover all exceptions.
In the total absence of any indication that the 1948 revision intended to broaden the scope of the prohibition against federal courts
72. In the Toucey decision, ibid., the 1941 Court recognized such implied statutory
exceptions to the anti-injunction statute as the Removal Acts, the Interpleader Act
of 1926, and the Frazier-Lemke Act. Only the Interpleader Act, of all these statutes
creating exclusive federal jurisdiction, contained a provision "expressly authorizing"
a federal injunction against state-court proceedings. See notes 74-85, infra, and accompanying text.
73. Penn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 189 (1935) ; United
States v. Bank of N. Y. & Trust Co., 296 U. S.463 (1936) (extending the rule to the
United States as a party).
74. H. R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A181-A182.
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(quite the contrary), it could be fairly concluded that the first
exception made no change in the prior law.75 The majority in
RicLman, however, in disapproving the controversial alternative
holding in Bowles v. Willingham76 stated:
It is also to be noted
that this observation was made prior to
7
the revision of 1948. 7
The "observation" proclaimed that, in the area of exclusive federal jurisdiction, Section 2283's predecessor was inapplicable.
Both the holding and the above quote in Richman seem reasonably
clearly to mean that prior recognized "statutory" exceptions are
no longer exceptions unless "expressly authorized by Act of Congress." The only prior recognized exception 78 in this area where
federal-court injunction were expressly authorized was the Interpleader Act of 1926. 79 Even the Bankruptcy Act, standing alone,
contains no provision expressly authorizing" injunctions against
state proceedings. 0 Bankruptcy proceedings under present Section 2283 may still be exceptions, not because of the language of
the section, but because of the mention thereof in the Reviser's
Notes. The Richman decision gives no answer either as to the
future of bankruptcy proceedings or others, unless the answer is
that the 1948 revision has now placed them within the general
prohibition.8 ' That would mean that the Interpleader Act would
be the only Toucey-recognized "statutory" exception encompassed
within Section 2283. Assuming, arguendo, that this is so, it may
not be inappropriate since, but for the express authority to enjoin
state proceedings, those state proceedings conflicting with interpleader would be unenjoinable under Section 2283. Federal interpleader would be an in personam proceedings ;82 the conflicting
75. "This first exception made by § 2283 represents no change in the prior law."
410 (1949).

MooRE, COMMENTARY ON THE JUDICIAL CODE

76. See note 65, supra, and accompanying text.
77. 23 U. S. L WEEK at 4166, n. 2.
78. L e., recognized in the Toucey case, op. cit. supra, note 71. Bowles v. Willingham recognized one other-the Emergency Price Control Act-which contained express
authority to enjoin state proceedings. § 205(d). This was an alternative holding.
Degas v. American Surety Co., 300 U. S. 414
79. 28 U. S. C. § 2361 (1949).

(1937).
80. In the Bankruptcy Act, neither §§2a(15), lla, nor 75 "expressly authorize"
injunctions against state proceedings.
81. The Reviser's Notes explain that proceedings in bankruptcy are still exceptions and that the new language of section 2283 covers all exceptions. Because of the
proximity of the Toucey decision, "all exceptions" could be interpreted to mean the
"statutory" exceptions recognized in Toucey itself. This would be of some comfort,
except for the Richman language, supra note 77, and accompanying text.
82. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518, 521, 522 (1916)
Cf.
(holding interpleader to be in personam within the rule of Pennoyer v. Neff).
N.Y. C.P.A. §§285-287 (1954) (legislative attempt to convert interpleader into a
quasi in rem proceeding). Federal declaratory judgment actions are similar to interpleader actions, and, if held to be in personam, are not a basis for enjoining conflicting

concurrent state action. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270 (1941).
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state proceedings would be in personam; jurisdiction is concurrent ;83 and, under Kline v. Burke Construction Co.,84 such state
proceedings are definitely -within the compass of the prohibition
of Section 2283. All other "statutory" exceptions discussed confer exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts, but with no express
authorization to enjoin state proceedings. Will exclusive jurisdiction, standing alone, constitute "expressly authorized" within the
first exception?8 5
Conceivably, the statutory exceptions herein discussed may
now be deemed to fall within the second exception of Section 2283:
"where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction". The Reviser's Notes
indicate that at least the removal exception does:
The phrase "in aid of its jurisdiction" was added to conform to
section 1651 of this title and to make clear the recognized power
of the Federal courts to stay proceedings in State cases removed
to the district courts 8 6
If the second exception encompasses, in addition to removal cases,
all other cases involving exclusive federal jurisdiction, then the
problem may be settled. If so, Section 2283 applies to any and all
problems involving a conflict of state-federal jurisdiction, whether
the jurisdiction is concurrent or exclusive. However, complications remain because of the Richman decision. That decision held
that an exclusive-jurisdiction case does not fall within the second
exception unless the exclusive federal jurisdiction involved is in
the district court itself.8 7 Since only the Labor Board has jurisdiction in any Taft-Hartley dispute, a district court could not be
said to be enjoining a state proceeding in aid of "its" jurisdiction.
Again, and with no discussion at all, the Richman decision defies
Bowles v. Willingham, where the district court was permitted to
enjoin a state proceeding albeit exclusive jurisdiction of the matter
involved was in the Emergency Court of Appeals."8 After Richman, then, a federal-court plaintiff who is harassed by void state
proceedings may invoke the second exception of Section 2283 only
1335.

83. Federal jurisdiction is based on modified diversity of citizenship.

28 U. S. C.

84. 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
85. The insertion of the words "expressly authorized" may have been the result
of unwise drafting. But see language of Justice Frankfurter in Richman: "In the
face of this carefully considered enactment . . ." 23 U. S. L. WEEK at 4166.
86. 28 U. S. C. § 1651 is the All Writs statute. See notes 57-60, supra.
87. 23 U. S. L. WEEK at 4167. "Under no circumstances has the District Court
jurisdiction to enforce rights and duties which call for recognition by the Board.
Such nonexistent jurisdiction therefore cannot be aided." See supra note 58.
88. See supra note 64, and accompanying text.
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before a federal tribunal capable of exercising the exclusive federal jurisdiction.89
It would seem that there may be a fatal flaw in attempting to
invoke the second exception of Section 2283. Assuming the federal
plaintiff sues in a federal court which would have power to exercise
the exclusive federal jurisdiction, the All Writs statute, 90 with
which the second exception of Section 2283 is deemed to conform, 91
and with which Section 2283 must be read,92 also contains the requirement that a prerogative writ cannot issue out of federal courts
except "in aid of their respective jurisdictions". In light of the
juxtaposition of the All Writs statute and Section 2283's second
exception, it is not unreasonable to assume that an injunction or
stay under the exception must rest on the same ground as a writ
of mandamus or prohibition under the All Writs statute-the writ
issues only "in aid of" the court's jurisdiction.9 3 Clearly, if the
district court already has acquired jurisdiction over a res, 94 or a
removal petition and bond have been filed,9 5 then a stay of an
interfering state proceeding could be said to be "in aid of" its
actual jurisdiction, or, ancillary thereto. 6 Without more, prior
in personam jurisdiction in a federal court did uot ground an
ancillary stay of a concurrent state proceeding under the All
Writs statute before 1948,"7 and the incorporation of the "in aid"
language in Section 2283 would seem to evidence a continuance of
that rule. But if the prayer for a federal injunction of a state
action is not ancillary, but is original, as it was in Richnan and in
the other cases of state-usurpation of exclusive federal jurisdiction, then of what federal-court jurisdiction could an injunction
be deemed to be "in aid"? As was stated by the majority in the
Richman case, 98
In any event, it has never been authoritatively suggested that
this example of injunctive aid to a potential jurisdiction, which
finds roots in traditional concepts of the relationship between
inferior and superior courts of the same judicial system, has
89. See N. L. R. B. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 125 F. 2d 757 (9th Cir. 1942) (court

of appeals protecting its exclusive jurisdiction over review of N. L. R. B. orders).

Where a court of appeals is asked, under section 2283's second exception, to enjoin
state proceedings "in aid of" its potential appellate jurisdiction, other problems may
arise. See notes 58, supra, 90, et seq., infra, and accompanying texts.
90. 28 U. S. C. § 1651. See notes 57-60, supra, and accompanying text.
91. See note 86, supra, and accompanying text.
92. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229 (1922).
93. Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578 (1943).
94. See note 73, suPra.
95. 28 U. S. C. §§ 1441, et seq. (removal).
96. For the proposition that "ancillary" jurisdiction of a federal court was an
exception to the predecessor of § 2283, see Barrett, op. cit., supra, n. 12, 549-550.
97. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., op. cit. supra, note 93.
98. 23 U. S. L. WEaK 4167 n. 5.
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any relevance where the offending action sought to be enjoined
is insulated by two intervening and essentially unrelated systems, one of any administrative rather than judicial nature [the
Labor Board, herein], the other the manifestation of a distinct
sovereign authority.

Although a prerogative writ is available in aid of a court's prospective jurisdiction, 9 this has only related to appellate jurisdiction
of courts of appeals and the Supreme Court.10 0 The district courts
have original jurisdiction only, for the most part.10 1 A district
court has never been known to issue a prerogative writ unless that
original jurisdiction was actual--never where it was merely prospective. 0 2 The Supreme Court's use of prerogative writs has been
confined to aiding its prospe.tive appellate jurisdiction over cases
already in lower federal courts, 0 3 although the Court also has
original jurisdiction. Thus, in the area of exclusive federal jurisdiction, where no separate complaint has been filed in the district
court, it has no actual jurisdiction over the matter being invalidly
litigated in the state court. Since the district court will not review
the state proceeding, it has no prospective jurisdiction. Thus,
within the second exception to Section 2283 and
within the All
4
Writs statute there is no jurisdiction to "aid' 1
99. Ex parte Peru, supra note 93.
100. Ibid. And see 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 74-85 (1948).
101. One instance of a district court's appellate jurisdiction would be its power
to review orders of a referee in bankruptcy. § 39c of Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 67c.
102. See Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. L & P. R.
Co., 294 U. S. 648 (1935) ; United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205 (1952). A district
court should not enjoin action which is not detrimental to its jurisdiction, even though
it has attached. Callaway v. Benton, 336 U. S. 132 (1949). Nor should a writ issue
which would enjoin action not affecting the merits of the matter actually before the
district court. DeBeers Consolidated Mines v. United States, 325 U. S. 212 (1945).
103. Ex parte Peru, supra note 93; Ex parte United States, 287 U. S. 241, 246
(1932); McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268 (1910).
104. Jurisdiction of the district court under 28 U. S. C. § 1337 or § 1332 (law
regulating commerce or diversity) would be the jurisdiction to hear the prayer for
a stay of state proceedings, requiring no prerogative writ in its "aid".
A writ, if issuable, would be directed to proceedings in a state court. Note that,
originally, the power of federal courts to issue writs of mandamus was restricted to
"courts appointed . . . under the authority of the United States." § 13, Judiciary Act
of 1789. The present All Writs statute does not contain this limitation. But see
Biggs v. Ward, 212 F. 2d 209 (1954), where a district court was held without sufficient prior jurisdiction to issue a writ against a state court judge. The power of
the Supreme Court itself to mandamus a state Supreme Court, even "in aid" of its
appellate jurisdiction is not without doubt. See Lavender v. Clark, 329 U. S. 674 (1946) ;
Ex pare Texas, 315 U.S. 8 (1942). Cf. U.S. ex rel. Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall.
575 (U. S. 1869); Gordon v. Longest, 16 Pet. 97 (U. S. 1842), indicating that such
power exists.
Obviously, section 2283 is vague, and Toucey itself casts doubt, but void or
fraudulently-obtained judgments or decrees in state courts could be enjoined as to
enforcement prior to Toncey. Chase National Bank v. City of Norwalk, Ohio, 291
U. S. 431 (1934) ; P.S.C. Co. v. Corboy, 250 U. S. 153 (1919) ; Wells Fargo & Co.
v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920); Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891). Since
the state-court injunction in Richman will be void because the state court had no jurisdiction (Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, supra, note 29), it should be enjoinable today.
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The third exception to Section 2283 would seem to be inapplicable in this area of exclusive federal jurisdiction where no prior
federal-court judgment has been rendered on the matters in the
state proceeding. 1 5
CONCLtUSION

To hold that Section 2283, with its "specific exceptions", is
applicable to the situation where a state court is invalidly litigating matter within exclusive federal jurisdiction would, in light of
the above discussion and the Iichman decision, condemn the section as an enactment which raises more questions than it solves.
The virtue of an amendatory statute should be that it does just
the opposite. 10 6 The thesis of this paper is that situations of conflict between state and federal courts involving exclusive federal
jurisdiction is not within the compass of Section 2283 at all, was
not intended to be, and never was subject to the provisions of the
predecessors of Section 2283. In the complete absence of any evidence that the 1948 enactment of Section 2283 was intended to
broaden the prohibition of the anti-injunction statute, the power of
federal courts to protect against state-usurpation of exclusive
federal jurisdiction should remain unhampered by Section 2283.
Certainly, it would seem, authority for such a rule is to be found
in cases permitting the United States to enjoin state proceedings
against it. 0 7
Problems of when a matter is or is not within the jurisdiction
of federal courts is commonly vexing, even in cases other than
labor relations. District courts consistently face this problem of
determining jurisdiction of courts in our federal system in hand105. It

would

seem relatively clear that the third exception, "to effectuate its

judgments", relates to the cases being litigated in state courts after having already
been litigated in a federal court. Thus the exception is deemed to overrule Toucey
insofar as it held relitigation cases not within the exceptions to section 2283's predecessor. See Reviser's Notes, H. R. REP. 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A181-A182.
106. ".

.

. any amendment should properly solve more questions than it raises.

The proposed revision does not appear to have this virtue." Barrett, op. cit. supra,
note 12, at 563 (referring to § 2283 when its adoption was being considered).
107. See United States v. McIntosh, 57 F. 2d 573 (E. D. Va. 1932) ; Brown v.
Wright, 137 F. 2d 484, 488 (4th Cir. 1943) (Price Administrator permitted to enjoin
for United States) ; United States v. Inaba, 291 Fed. 416 (E. D. Wash. 1923). Cases
have held that, since section 2283 does not mention the United States, it does not bar
it from enjoining state action. United States v. Cain, 72 F. Supp. 897 (W. D. Mich.
1947) ; United States v. Taylor's Oak Ridge Corp., 89 F. Supp. 28 (E. D. Tenn. 1950).
The position that section 2283 did not apply to the United States was urged on the
Supreme Court in Phillips v. United States, 312 U. S. 246 (1941), but the appeal was
decided on other grounds. In Phillips, the district court had stated: "[The section]
does not . . . bar this court from enjoining further proceedings in the state court."
33 F. Supp. 261, 270 (N. D. Okla. 1940). Contra: U. S. v. Land Title Bank & Trust
Co., 90 F. 2d 970 (3rd Cir. 1937).
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ling applications for removal of actions from state courts.1 08 And,
like the removal cases, where federal jurisdiction is being urged,
federal courts, not state courts, are deemed far better equipped to
decide the matter in the first instance. If an injunction against
a state proceeding is either granted or denied, the jurisdictional
question is readily reviewed by higher federal authority. 10 9 In
this area of state-court litigation of matter exclusively federal
the removal statutes are of little or no aid to the harrassed statecourt defendant, since an order of a district court remanding a
case is not reviewable.1 0
Federal-court jurisdiction having attached, either under 28
U. S. C. Sections 1337, 1332, or any other appropriate statute,
general equity power of a district should properly be invoked to
enjoin invalid state proceedings-all quite apart from the provisions of Section 2283. The very federal supremacy which denies
to a state court the power to interfere -with a federal court's determination on federal jurisdiction, as in the removal cases,"' also
provides the ground for a federal court to protect federal jurisdiction against state-court usurpation thereof. The Richman holding that Section 2283 is applicable to exclusive jurisdiction cases
only tends to frustrate an entire federal scheme. In addition, as
the Chief Justice stated,
To read § 2283 literally-as the majority opinion does-ignores
not only this legislative history, but also a century of judicial
history.112

108. See, for discussions of procedures for determining removability, HART &
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
COMMENTARY ON THE JUDICIAL CODE 265-280 (1949).

1031-1035 (1953) ; MoopE,

109. 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (a). Jurisdiction to hear the prayer for an injunction
would be grounded, e.g., on 28 U. S. C. § 1337 or § 1332 (law regulating commerce
or diversity).
110. 28 U.S. C. § 1447(d).
111. Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U. S. 529 (1922); Harrison v. St.
Louis &"Sat Francisco R. Co., 232 U.S. 318 (1914); Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v.
Whitton's Admr.o 13 Wall. 270 (U. S. 1871)
112. 23 U. S. L. WEEK at 4169 (dissenting opinion).

